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Over the last two decades, Barcelona has implemented a far-reaching 
reform of the city’s solid waste management. In 2000, the city was divided in 
four zones, with four separate solid waste collection contracts being 
awarded to private firms, with none being allowed to obtain more than two 
zones, a rule that was revised in 2009 to just one contract per firm. This 
division of the market via exclusive territories sought to enhance competition 
in the expectation of the convergence of relative costs, efficiency and service 
quality throughout the city. Based on monthly observations of costs and 
outputs between 2015 and 2018, this paper analyzes and evaluates the 
creation of lots as a tool of competition. We find that firms producing in larger 
zones report higher costs, that increased competition was not sufficient to 
lead to converging costs, and that none of the firms operate under 
increasing returns to scale. As such, we recommend creating an additional 
zone. We further suggest that if one of the zones were to be subject to public 
production, and adopted a mixed delivery provision strategy, the ability of the 
regulator to deal with asymmetric information would improve and a more 
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1. Introduction  
The growing predisposition in many countries to turn to privatization and private companies to 
build and operate infrastructure and deliver public services has seen a corresponding increase in 
interest in the regulation of private actors. Discussions as to whether public or private ownership 
is more beneficial for social welfare have been central to debates in both economics and public 
policy and arguments for the superiority of both have been offered. However, most recent meta-
analyses of the production choice and its associated costs show no significant cost differences 
between the two forms of production (Bel and Warner 2008; Bel, Fageda, and Warner 2010). 
Beyond the public versus private production dilemma, competition has been theoretically argued 
and empirically shown to be crucial for a cost-advantageous production (Boyne 1996; Hefetz and 
Warner 2004; Bel 2006), and, as a result, local governments have made increasing efforts to enhance 
competition in the market place (Bel and Fageda 2011; Gradus, Schoute and Dijkgraaf 2018; Hefetz 
and Warner 2012).  
The objective of this study, therefore, is to analyze waste management reforms that can 
successfully contribute to enhancing competition in the waste market. To do so, we study the waste 
collection service in the city of Barcelona, where regulation by competition has been in operation 
for several decades. In the city of Barcelona, four exclusive waste collection zones have been 
awarded by means of a ‘split auction’ (Laffont and Tirole 1993), for which the duplication of fixed 
costs is justified by the yardstick competition effect (Auriol and Laffont 1992).  
Besides promoting competition, innovations in management styles and in the use of 
information and communication technology are key to improving the quality and efficiency of 
public service delivery (Lundsgaard 2003). Similarly, and more specifically in local service delivery, 
a number of strategies other than managing competition have gained traction in recent decades, 
such as inter-municipal cooperation, re-municipalization, and mixed public/private delivery (Bel, 





review of the most relevant literature on privatization and the alternatives to it. Then, we describe 
the main historical and institutional characteristics of solid waste management in Barcelona. 
In reporting our empirical analysis, we, first, analyze the cost determinants of solid waste 
services in Barcelona, and investigate whether there are any differences in the cost and scale 
economies of the four existing waste collection zones. Based on these results, we then propose a 
design for a potential reform aimed at improving the efficiency of solid waste management, the 
specific objective being to enhance competition and improve the city authorities’ regulatory 
capabilities vis-à-vis private contracts for solid waste collection. In this way, we contribute to the 
existing literature by developing a technically based design for the reform of a waste management 
system which, given that it serves a large urban area (specifically, the city of Barcelona), can be 
applied to similar contexts where large scales of operation allow the service management to be split 
without being detrimental to the economies of scale.  
2. Privatization and its alternatives 
2.1 Regulation by competition 
Since the cost-saving effects of privatization appear to be neither systematic nor sustainable, cost-
saving competition has emerged as a key concern in management reform for delivering positive 
economic effects. One of the most frequently used methods for promoting such competition has 
traditionally been public procurement through auctions. Yet, when bidders only compete for the 
market in a static fashion, as opposed to competing in the market in a more dynamic fashion, the 
positive cost-saving effects of competition are decreasing over time and may even disappear (Bel 
and Costas 2006; Gradus, Schoute, and Dijkgraaf 2018; Hefetz and Warner 2012). Even if at the 
time of bidding rivalry exists, a more dynamic form of competition – which we can be defined as 
extended rivalry (Porter 1998) – is missing. 
Dynamic competition among several producers in the same market can be induced by 
delimiting exclusive territories, that is, dividing the market up into different areas, each served by a 





segmentation (Tirole 1988), and can be said to lie somewhere between the two polar models of 
perfect competition and pure monopoly (Rey and Stiglitz 1995). The entry of new players may be 
socially desirable if players can be compared and even when they cannot be, if we allow for 
differentiated output. However, the strategy can induce inefficiency as a result of the duplication 
of fixed costs and by being detrimental to the exploitation of economies of scale. As for the 
monitoring of private actors, group incentive mechanisms are likely to arise in which the actions 
of one agent provide information about the actions of other agents, and the principal is able to 
monitor ‘agents with other agents’ (Varian 1990).  
2.2 Inter-municipal Cooperation 
Unlike privatization, inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) is based on strategic collaboration rather 
than on competition, the aim being to achieve economies of scale (and, hence, improve the cost 
conditions of the service) and to enhance coordination so as to better tackle externalities (Bel and 
Warner 2015 and 2016; Plata-Díaz et al. 2014; Pérez-López et al. 2016). The advantages of IMC 
include the possibility of retaining greater control over production and, hence, of incurring lower 
transaction costs than those incurred under privatization (Levin and Tadelis 2010; Hefetz and 
Warner 2012; Bel, Fageda, and Mur 2014). Such a situation is particularly desirable when enhanced 
service quality and cross-jurisdictional coordination are also sought (Aldag and Warner, 2018). 
Indeed, IMC affords policy-makers with the possibility of ‘finding equilibrium’ and avoiding 
extreme ideological positions in relation to public or private provisions (Voorn, Van Genugten, 
and Van Thiel 2020). It should, however, be noted that service provision by means of IMC is 
compatible with both private production (i.e. as illustrated by cases in Spain and France) and limited 
public production (i.e. as illustrated by cases in the Netherlands and Norway). 
Since service delivery by IMC means the participants use ‘functional consolidation’ (as 
opposed to the full amalgamation of municipalities), a potential efficiency gain can be made. 
However, cost-advantage studies of IMC have produced diverging results. In a recent meta-





populations, in which the governance of cooperation is delegated to supra-municipal governments, 
especially as regards solid waste collection, tend to show cost-savings from cooperation.  
2.3 Re-municipalization 
Reforms in the form of contract reversal have shown the existence of a ‘two-way street’, that is, 
from the privatization of management toward contracting back in (or reverse privatization) 
(Warner and Hefetz 2012). Indeed, processes of re-municipalization have become the subject of 
considerable political debate in recent decades, although they are by no means a new phenomenon 
(Bel 2020). However, these has been a resurgence in these contract reversals for reasons of  
managerial pragmatism, disappointment with the outcomes achieved with service delivery 
privatization and the failure of governments to monitor and manage the contract; hence, re-
municipalization may be grounded in market failure, government failure or in both (Hefetz and 
Warner 2004). To a lesser extent, political context and ideological motivation have also been 
identified as factors in some cases (Gradus and Budding 2020).  
Service characteristics are an important factor determining the likelihood (or otherwise) of 
contracting back in. Overall, if monitoring is costly and there are measurement difficulties, and 
competition is absent, a government is more likely to consider contracting back in (Nelson 1997). 
According to Hefetz and Warner (2004) examples of such services include utility billing, building 
maintenance, heavy equipment and emergency vehicles, street repair, traffic signs, recreation 
facilities, tree trimming, legal services, street cleaning and sanitary inspection. Moreover, re-
municipalization can be a useful tool for local governments seeking to correct dynamic 
inefficiencies and so satisfy a broader range of public values (Lindholst 2019).  
2.4 Mixed Delivery 
Between the extremes of fully contracting out and re-municipalization, an intermediate solution is 
offered by mixed delivery. This involves the fragmentation of a jurisdiction into several territories, 
of which at least one is subject to public production and another to private production (Savas 1981; 





In theory, the primary argument in support of a mixed system of production is derived 
from the reliability engineering rule, which requires that the units of the system – in our case public 
and private companies – be independent (Bendor 1985). The desirability for some duplication can 
only be analyzed in the context of the consequences of system vulnerability and the probability of 
failure. If bankruptcy is expensive and its probability of occurrence is high, redundancy can be a 
convenient instrument. From an innovation perspective, doubling organizational units increases 
the likelihood of improving the quality of production of public services and, in the long run, greater 
efficiency can be achieved (Bendor 1985). Therefore, while noting that redundancy is not always 
convenient in public policy, it can be an important asset in a large, metropolitan city facing 
pressures emanating from a variety of sources. 
Moreover, a mixed system ensures that the government gains knowledge and expertise 
about the delivery of the service. This has two important implications: First, it improves the 
government’s ability to monitor and supervise private providers; and, second, it reduces the 
vulnerability of the whole system, since it is easier for the government to take over a private district 
in case of service failure. Hence, mixed delivery ensures a failsafe service, as emphasized by Miranda 
and Lerner (1995). Indeed, this works in the other direction too: For example, in a city vulnerable 
to public sector strikes, the presence of a private firm and its ability to take over the delivery of the 
public unit create a more reliable system. Evidence also suggests that the participating units can 
learn from each other in terms of process innovation (Ammons and Hill 1995). This property of 
‘equipotentiality’ allows the system to offer creative responses to adjustments in the environment 
(Landau 1969). Indeed, an adaptable and reliable mixed system can contribute to meeting the 
challenges of a growing city and its increasing demand for waste collection. Finally, a mixed system 
can imply a behavioral effect, given that the public unit can provide an audit function, in the sense 






3. Institutional context: Waste management in the city of Barcelona 
Solid waste collection has historically been delivered by private firms in the city of Barcelona. By 
the end of the Franco Dictatorship and following the first democratic municipal election in 1979, 
a shift in focus saw greater importance being given to citizen participation and greater relevance to 
the city districts and local democracy (Ajuntament de Barcelona 1999). With the Municipal Action 
Plan 1992–1995 (Programa D’Actuació Municipal), the city government launched its plan to extend 
selective waste collection throughout the city, promoting the market of recycled products and 
attempting to provide an urgent solution to uncontrolled dumping (Ajuntament de Barcelona 1992, 
65). The two private concessions managing solid waste collection at that time, held by Fomento de 
Construcciones y Contratas (FCC) and Concesionaria y Contratas de Usuarios de Servicios de 
Limpieza Pública (CLD), were due to expire in 2000 (Bel and Warner 2009).1  
In 2000 the city was divided into four zones, with four separate solid waste collection 
contracts being awarded to private firms, with none being allowed to obtain more than two zones.2 
Barcelona’s solid waste management model was the outcome of systematic planning, with 
importance being attached to the role in this of both the private and public sectors (Bel and Warner 
2009). The municipality of Barcelona believed that its policy would create redundancy in public 
service delivery and lead to improvements in efficiency, innovation and quality and to a more 
reliable system to react to the city’s unexpected or novel needs. The city argued that fragmentation 
would allow private firms to address the specific characteristics of each territory, which it was 
known could differ markedly with the season of the year. 
                                                 
1 The first direct contract between CLD and the Barcelona city council for waste collection provision dates 
back to 1964, whereas FCC, established initially in 1900 as Fomento de Obras y Construcciones (FOCSA), 
had a long history of cooperation with Barcelona in local service delivery, starting with a contract in 1911 
for street cleaning and conservation. 
2 The service reform involved the joint awarding of solid waste collection and street cleaning in each zone 
to the same private firm. This characteristic has been maintained in all subsequent contracting processes. It 
should be stressed, however, that all contracts, supervision and payments clearly distinguish between the 
two services in each zone and, consequently, all the data used in our empirical strategy refer solely to the 





The contracts awarded in 2000 had an initial duration of seven years; yet, before 
termination, they were extended for an additional two years. In 2009, after a new bidding process, 
the city kept the number of zones the same, but modified their structure by making some changes 
in the districts included within each. In this bidding process, firms were obliged to bid for all four 
zones, even though it was now dictated that only one contract would be awarded per firm. As a 
result of the bidding process, the award of contracts in each zone (comprising city districts) was as 
follows: North (Horta-Guinardó and Nou Barris) was awarded to CLD Urbaser; Center (Ciutat 
Vella, Eixample and Gràcia) was awarded to FCC; East (Sant Andreu and  Sant Martí) was awarded 
to Urbaser; and West (Sants-Montjuic, Les Corts and Sarrià-Sant Gervasi) was awarded to CEPSA. 
The Center zone also included pneumatics and the East zone included the city’s beaches. 
In the upcoming concession for the period 2019-2027,3 the fragmentation into four zones 
has been maintained, and each bidder has to make a bid for at least two zones, although – as in the 
previous process – only one contract can be awarded per firm. The new contracts have an eight-
year duration with the possibility of a two-year extension (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2018a). In the 
latest call for waste management contracts, the city has stressed the importance of environmental 
quality and sustainability, information, transparency and social policies (Ajuntament de Barcelona 
2018b). These changes have been introduced to create a more innovative system, deemed 
particularly important in a Mediterranean city like Barcelona, where tourism is high and, the 
potential impact of climate change is great. 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
4.1 Empirical background 
Empirical analyses of the factors impacting solid waste management – starting with Hirsch (1965) 
– have sought to model refuse collection costs taking into account factors related primarily to scale 
                                                 
3 The bidding process is still undergoing. The firms will take over the service nine months after the award. 





economies, break-even points and price determination. Following Hirsch’s pioneering study, 
Stevens (1978) introduced significant improvements by considering the market structure, 
differentiating between (1) market provision under a competitive system, and (2) public provision 
with either (2a) a public monopoly or (2b) private monopoly. Stevens reported the existence of 
economies of scale up to 50,000 inhabitants, while beyond this population size, he found constant 
returns to scale. In his comparative study, he showed market provision to be between 26 and 48% 
more costly than monopolies under public provision, indicating that the gains from competition 
were lower than the transaction costs incurred, since there was no sign of additional inefficiency 
due to competition. In the case of public provision, he reported no significant cost difference 
between public and private production below a population of 50,000, while private production was 
less costly above that population threshold. 
Another major advance was made in empirical studies by Dubin and Navarro (1988). Here, 
the authors also analyzed solid waste collection costs under market and public provisions (with 
either a public or private monopoly), but prior to this they controlled for the form of production, 
so that any potential endogeneity of the latter and costs was dealt with. As in Stevens (1978), market 
provision was found to be the least efficient system; while, within public provision, private 
production was less costly than public. 
Following on from these empirical analyses of solid waste management, an increasing 
number of studies have appeared, especially after 2000 (see Bel and Warner, 2008, and Bel, Fageda, 
and Warner, 2010, for a review). Most papers failed to find a significant difference in the outcomes 
of public and private production (Allesch and Brunner 2014). Indeed, similar conclusions have 
been obtained in more recent studies (e.g. Jacobsen, Buysse, and Gellynck 2013; Abrate et al. 2014).  
When modelling the costs of waste management parametrically, the relationship between 
outputs and inputs has usually been represented by a cost or production function. Both can include 
a variety of variables and may be either linear or non-linear. Similarly, many previous studies, in 





In this paper, we also adopt this type of modelling; however, our study is unique as it analyzes the 
costliness of the waste management lots following the divisions made in the city of Barcelona, 
which provides us with a jurisdictionally but also politically (in the sense of the governing party, 
see Benito-López, Moreno-Enguix, and Solana-Ibañez, 2011) homogeneous context. As in Bel 
(2006), and omitting the variables that this author found not to cause additional variability in our 
framework – namely, salaries and frequency of collection, which are equivalent in all four of the 
city’s concessions – our cost function can be expressed as: 
 
 
𝑇𝐶 = 𝐹 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 , 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 ,  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚,   𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑, 𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚                       (1) 
 
 






Table 1. Data for the variables used in our estimations refer to the period 2015–2018 and 
were provided by the city agency that supervises the solid waste service. We have available monthly 
observations for the costs and solid waste quantities of each type. Data regarding inhabitants in 
each district are annual. Descriptive statistics for the main variables are displayed in table A-1, in 
the appendix. We computed the variance inflation factor (VIF) to check the potential relevance of 
multicollinearity and found an average value equivalent to 598.74. For this reason, we excluded the 
variables with the highest individual VIF values (that is, density, surface, and population). 
Moreover, given that the various categories of waste are correlated, we opted to use the variable 
Rest waste expressed in absolute terms, while for the other categories we used the relative weight of 
the waste as a percentage of total waste. After this we ran the VIF check again and found that 
individual value for tourism was 27.91, and so we eliminated this variable. As a result, the remaining 







Table 1: Description of the variables used in the estimations. 
Dependent Var Description 
Total Cost Total costs incurred by the municipality for the service of waste management by 
zones by month from 2015 to 2018 
Independent Var Description 
Rest waste Monthly volume of rest waste collected by zone from 2015-2018 in tones 
Organic waste Monthly volume of organic waste collected by zone from 2015-2018 in tones 
Paper waste Monthly volume of paper waste collected by zone from 2015-2018 in tones 
Packaging waste Monthly volume of packaging & plastic waste collected by zone 2015-2018 in tones 
Voluminous waste Monthly volume of voluminous waste collected by zone 2015-2018 in tones 
Glass waste Monthly volume of glass waste collected by zone 2015 to 2018 in tones 
Surface Area of the zones in km2 
Population Number of inhabitants in the zone 
Density Inhabitants per km2 
Tourism Number of touristic establishments in the zone 
August Dummy variable taking the value of 1 in the month of August 
FCC Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the zone of FCC 
CESPA Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the zone of CESPA 
URBASER Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the zone of Urbaser 
CLD Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the zone of CLD 
 
 
5. Estimations and results of the empirical analysis 
Our basic estimations are shown in Table 2. The first model using OLS gives the expected results 
in terms of Rest waste, which is not selective, paper, packaging, glass and voluminous residues. All 
of them have a positive impact on costs, except packaging, which is probably due to the more 
specialized and more costly service for handling selected waste. Due to heteroskedasticity, we 
applied robust standard errors; however, our results did not change substantially. Exploiting the 
panel structure of our data, we tested both the fixed and random effects models. Since we could 
not reject the null hypothesis of no systematic difference in coefficients, the random effects model 






Table 2: Empirical Results of the Estimation of the Determinants of the Cost of Waste Management. 
Ind. Variables OLS (Pooled) Robust OLS (Pooled) Fixed effects Random effects 




































































between = 0.9996 
total= 0.8205 
#Observations 192 192 192 192 
# groups   4 4 
F 120.12*** 238.39*** 9.10***  
Prob>F 0 .0000 0 .0000 0 .0000  
Wald chi2    840.84*** 
prob>chi2    0.0000 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1% level; indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates significance at 10%. In 
parenthesis standard errors. 
    
 
Next, we analyzed differences between zones/firms. We should stress that we cannot 
disentangle differences in a given area’s productivity from that of the specific conditions of a zone. 





Table . CESPA has higher costs than the average firm, whereas CLD has lower costs than 
average. Additionally, we compared the costs of each firm with the costs incurred by the other 
three (see Table A-2 in the Appendix). FCC’s costs are not statistically different from those of any 
other firm; CESPA is more expensive than Urbaser, which is also cheaper than CLD, although the 
statistical significance of this last relationship is weaker. Overall, CESPA appears to be the most 





Table 3: Empirical Results of the Estimation of the Determinants with a random effects model of the Cost 
of Waste Management. 
Ind. Variables FCC CESPA Urbaser CLD 


























































   
CESPA  300,168** 
(137,349) 
  
Urbaser   -222,359 
(170,217) 
 
CLD    -454,267** 
(213,611) 









R-sq within: 0.7977 
between: 0.9999 
total: 0. 9522 
within: 0.8037 
between: 1.0000 
total: 0. 9537 
within: 0.7995 
between: 0.9999 




#Observations  192 192 192 192 
# groups 4 4 4 4 
Wald chi2 2,726.19*** 2,820.48*** 2,756.45*** 2,815.19*** 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1% level; indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates significance at 10%. In 
parenthesis standard errors. 
 
5.1 Economies of Scale 
Following the theoretical outcome regarding the importance of enhancing competition via split 
auctions, the next step in our research involved analyzing the convenience of increasing the number 
of solid waste collection zones in Barcelona, so as to increase competition. Thus, in this section we 
determine whether the creation of more zones and, hence, a reduction in the size of the current 
zones, leads to a loss of economies to scale. Preserving the current cost functions, if the firms 
already produce with constant returns to scale, a loss in size would not result in an increase in 





advisable in the case of diseconomies of scale, since reducing the size of the zones would lead to 
lower average costs.  
Some of the earlier studies of waste management costs undertook analyses of scale 
economies. The first to incorporate a systematic and robust analysis was Stevens (1978), who 
reported the presence of economies of scale for US municipalities with between 20,000 and 50,000 
inhabitants and constant returns to scale above that threshold. Likewise, Dubin and Navarro (1988) 
found increasing returns to scale for US municipalities with up to 20,000 inhabitants; Dijkgraaf and 
Gradus (2003) reported scale economies in Dutch municipalities with a population of fewer than 
40,000 inhabitants; and Bel and Costas (2006) found increasing economies of scale in the smaller 
municipalities of Catalonia, and full exploitation of economies of scale in municipalities with 
between 20,000 and 50,000 inhabitants. A notable exception is Bohm et al. (2010), who observed 
increasing returns to scale across all quantities of disposal waste in their sample of US 
municipalities. However, increasing returns to scale were soon exhausted in recycling waste, and 
diseconomies of scale appeared thereafter. Most of the evidence reported up to 2010 was analyzed 
by Gomez-Reino (2010) by means of meta-regression. The author concluded that there were only 
slight economies of scale in waste management, and that they were less relevant than those in the 
other public services considered in his study (e.g. education). 
More recent studies typically provide additional information. For example, Simões, 
Carvalho, and Marques (2012) show that the optimal scale in Portuguese municipalities depends 
on the producer and mode of production, but that, generally, the service delivery fully exploits scale 
economies with a population of between 25,000 and 50,000 inhabitants. Increasing returns to scale 
limited to smaller Portuguese municipalities are also found in a study by Simões, Cavalho, and 
Marques (2013). In a study of Japanese municipalities, Chifari et al. (2017) report economies of 
scale, but find that they are much less relevant in the case of waste collection than they are for 





constant returns to scale for the average municipality in their sample of 42,500 inhabitants. In the 
case of larger municipalities, the authors find diseconomies of scale in waste collection; however, 
these are counterbalanced by economies of scope up to a population size of 300,000 inhabitants. 
Finally, Greco et al. (2015) disentangled undifferentiated versus separate waste collection, finding 
the former to be cheaper and capable of achieving higher rates of economies of scale than the more 
expensive and specialized separate waste collection.  
In the case of the city of Barcelona, all the zones have populations above 300,000, which, 
based on previous studies, would seem to imply that their volumes of waste are well above the 
threshold at which of economies of scale can be fully exploited. As such, we expect to find either 
constant returns to scale or diseconomies of scale. In neither case, however, would the policy 
recommendation of creating an additional zone to enhance competition eliminate gains of 
increasing returns to scale, given that all existing zones are already well above that size.  
Many of the empirical studies that analyze solid waste use Hirsch’s (1965) definition, which 
states that the optimal scale is the level of operation at which average costs are lowest. This 
coincides with a scale elasticity of a unit value, and many empirical papers use the inverse of scale 
elasticity to define economies of scale (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1988), reflecting the 
proportional increase in total costs due to a proportional increase in output, ceteris paribus (Farsi, 
Filippini, and Lunati 2008). Hence, if this relation is lower than 1, it means that average costs 
increase (decrease) as output increases (decreases) and that we are in a situation of diseconomies 
(economies) of scale. In this paper, however, we are concerned with describing the current situation 
and of determining the effect of a one-unit increase in output on average costs, rather than on 
finding the optimal size. Broadly speaking, similar empirical studies either make use of the 
relationship identified by Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1988) using a logarithmic function or explain 





Here, we adhere to the average cost explanation and estimate both the linear and quadratic 
structures, as specified in Table 4: Random effects models with average costs as dependent variable.Table 
. These estimations do not include the quadratic component since it was found not to be statistically 
significant in any of the estimations. This implies that the relationship between the unit cost and 
output is similar to that reported in Stigler (1958), in the sense that scale economies are exhausted 
at relatively small sizes. After that, average costs are found until increasing marginal costs are 
achieved following a highly significant growth in population. Hence, our preferred specification is 
the linear model shown in the first column in Table 4 According to our estimation, 10,000 
additional tons of waste would lead, on average, to an increase in costs of 1.13 euros per ton. This 
specification, however, is unable to capture any possible differences between zones; hence, we can 
only conclude that the average zone in Barcelona is already in a state of diseconomies of scale at 
10%.  
To see zone-specific effects, we use interaction models as described in Brambor, Clark, and 
Golder (2006). Multiplicative models of this type are common in quantitative analyses in political 
science because they can capture the relationship between (political) inputs and (political) outputs 
depending on the institutional context (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).4 
  
                                                 
4 For example, Frère, Hammadou, and Paty (2011) interact a dummy variable representing urban areas with 
population size to see the effect on the range of public services provided; Andrews and Boyne (2014) use 
an interaction term between task complexity and size to determine a change in administrative intensity in 
UK universities; Sundell and Lapuente (2012) examine political incentives to contract out when both 
political competition and government ideology interact; Bos, Lamoen and Economidou (2010) seek to 
determine whether big banks under competition adopt different innovative behavior to that adopted by 
smaller banks; Trebesch and Zabel (2017) measure costs of sovereign debt by interacting default with a 
coerciveness index; Al-Jarrah, Al-Abdulqader and Hammoudeh (2019) interact characteristics of banks to 





Table 4: Random effects models with average costs as dependent variable. 
Ind. variables  Baseline Model FCC CESPA CLD URBASER 










FCC  0.930151  
(1.289607) 
    
VolxFCC  -0.000063 
(0.000058) 
   
CESPA   0.199694 
(1.142799) 
  
VolxCESPA   0.000023 
(0.000067) 
  
CLD    0.150256 
(1.150852) 
 
VolxCLD    0.000004 
(0.000115) 
 
URBASER     -1.953874 
(1.378008) 
































































































Time effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Nr of observations 192 192 192 192 192 
Nr of groups 4 4 4 4 4 
Wald chi2 1682.84*** 1677.28*** 1701.12*** 1660.46*** 1748.33*** 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1% level; indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates significance at 10%. In 
parenthesis standard error. 
 
This “context conditionality” suggests that the relationship between two variables depends 





between output and average costs is modified (increases or decreases) when the dummy variables 
of the firms are equal to 1. When we include the interaction term between the firm and the volume 
of production (e.g. FCCxVolume), all the constitutive terms must be included in the estimation 
(both the dummy of FCC and Volume). Our results in Table  show that the average effect of one 
additional ton of waste has a positive and significant effect on the average costs, hence the zones, 
on average, produce diseconomies of scale. Nevertheless, when including firm dummies and firm 
interactions, the statistical significance of volume disappears. Still, we obtain evidence that none of 
the firms is producing under increasing returns to scale. Similarly, the fact that none of the dummies 
for zones (nor the interactions) has a significant coefficient implies that they do not have any 
additional effect, whether decreasing or increasing, with respect to the average level of costs.  
 
6. Discussion and Policy Implications  
Our empirical analysis confirms the results of earlier empirical studies as regards the usual variables 
identified as affecting total costs in waste management. However, it should be borne in mind when 
interpreting our findings herein that it has often proved difficult to determine whether the service 
differences are attributable to the local conditions of each zone or to the firms’ production and 
cost function. Having said that, we proceeded to analyze any firm/zone-related differences 
between the lots and were able to determine that the four zones are indeed different from each 
other. Subsequently, we estimated which is the most costly and which the least. Thus, it is apparent 
that the current level of competition created by the local government through market 
fragmentation is insufficient to achieve the outcome of perfect competition (i.e., no differences in 
the firms’ relative costs).  
One way to enhance competition would be to increase fragmentation by introducing more 
lots, a solution that means bidders would have to compete both statically and dynamically: First, 
because now, in the auction phase, the zones are not so big, firms with lower capacities would also 





of regulation by competition with one more participant, the local regulator would have more 
information and the incentives of the participants would change. In addition, potential collusion 
would be less likely with more participants. 
One of the potential disadvantages of a higher level of fragmentation, however, is the 
possible elimination of economies of scale. To address this risk, we examined whether the firms 
are producing with increasing returns to scale. Since we have found evidence – on average – of 
the absence of economies of scale in every zone, one of our policy recommendations is for the 
creation of one additional zone. An example resulting from the creation of a new zone 
comprising the city districts of Sarrià-Sant Gervasi and Gràcia is shown in  
  Table .5 Figure compares the map of the existing division of zones with the one that would 
correspond to the proposal formulated. 
 
  Table 5: Possible fragmentation considering economies of scale and mixed delivery. 
Zone District Population % Firm % Population District Zone 
North Horta-
Guinardó 
Nou Barris  




Centre Ciutat Vella 
Eixample 
Gràcia 
486,593 30.0% B 22.6% 365,588 Ciuta Vella 
Eixample 
Centre 
East Sant Andreu 
Sant Martí  












    New 16.7% 270,117 Gràcia 




Total  1,620,343 100%  100% 1,620,343  Total 
Note: The service of pneumatics belongs to the zone of Center and beaches belong to the zone of East. The number 
of inhabitants refers to the year of 2018.  
 
 
                                                 
5 In making this suggestion we consider the existing constraint that solid waste collection zones must include 
entire city districts and that they cannot be split between different waste management zones. Ideally, the 
analysis should be conducted at the neighborhood (73 neighborhoods in the city) or even at the street level 
















Apart from fulfilling the goal of avoiding decreasing returns to scale, this reform could 
facilitate entry for smaller firms. Recall that the private contractors that initiated the service 
provision in the early stages (2000–2009) held onto the service and successfully won subsequent 
contracts. Hence, even though the market was divided into lots, competition was still quite weak.  
As outlined earlier, other than privatization and the management of competition, present-
day local delivery options include IMC, contract reversal or re-municipalization and mixed delivery. 
However, IMC is not recommendable for big markets like the city zones of Barcelona, being better 
suited to small municipalities where scale economies have yet to be fully exploited (Bel and Sebő, 
2019), The other two reforms can, though, be considered similar in the sense that they would 
involve the partial or full re-municipalization of waste management services in Barcelona. 
Moreover, if the newly created zone were to be public (or failing that if one of the original four 
zones were to be re-municipalized), information asymmetry could be improved, insofar as the 
possibilities for benchmarking by local government would be enhanced (Mols 2010a; 2010b) and 





Furthermore, creating a mixed system ensures that the public unit gains more knowledge 
about the service and is in a better position to assess the performance of the private agents. It also 
ensures that creative responses are given to specific problems and that knowledge is shared 
(Parmigiani 2007). Additionally, the emergence of new technological opportunities calls for a 
flexible organization to ensure their full exploitation, something that is particularly relevant in waste 
management, because this is one of the main public services in terms of budget consumption and  
because the links between the environment and waste generation are a pressing concern in these 
times of climate change. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we have analyzed the current situation and performance of the solid waste 
management service in the city of Barcelona. Based on our empirical findings, we have 
recommended a series of reforms that should help to improve the service by lowering costs and 
by improving system reliability. Consistent with our finding of the absence of increasing returns to 
scale in the city service with the current configuration of zones, our first policy recommendation 
is for the city to create – at least – one additional zone. Second, it is our belief that further 
improvements can be achieved in terms of system reliability, public values and symmetric 
information if one of the zones (either the newly created one or one of the original four zones) 
were to be subject to public production.  
One of the limitations of our paper is that we are largely unable to distinguish the 
characteristics of a given firm from those of the zone it is managing. Furthermore, the information 
available on costs and output is measured at the zone level (including full city-districts). Hence, we 
have been unable to examine other market design possibilities at a more micro-level. This is due 
lack of data below the zone level, which hinders effective monitoring by the local government. 
Future research would benefit from the additional availability of observations at district or 
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Table A-1: Descriptive statistics of the main variables. 
Main Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Cost of waste collection (€) 1,822,884 768,481 580,412 4,319,332 
Total Waste (Tons) 14,688 4,553 7,984 23,809 
Rest waste (Tons) 10,018 3,053 5,687 16,035 
Organic (%) 14.149 1.198 11.655 16.459 
Paper (%) 4.761 0.598 3.797 6.696 
Packaging (%) 3.138 0.609 2.246 5.023 
Glass (%) 4.684 0.939 3.155 6.682 
Voluminous (%) 4.917 1.401 2.690 8.138 
 
 
Table A2: Direct comparison of the firm dummies with the chosen reference group. 
Reference 
Included  

















Note: *** indicates significance at 1% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates significance at 10%, 
+indicates significance at 15%. In parenthesis standard errors.  
 
